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ANTITRUST LAW

OVERVIEW

Three Tenth Circuit antitrust decisions rendered during the past
survey period will be discussed in this article.' These cases involved
several issues in antitrust law. In Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen
Skiing Co. ,2 the court reviewed claims made by Aspen Highlands that the
Aspen Skiing Company had monopolized the market for skiing services
in the Aspen area, thereby violating section 2 of the Sherman Act. 3 The
Tenth Circuit applied both the "intent" doctrine and the "essential facilities" doctrine to conclude that the Ski Company had violated a "duty
to deal" with the Highlands Corporation. 4 This was the Tenth Circuit's
first use of the essential facilities doctrine, a recent development in antitrust law which is being applied by the courts as an avenue of analysis
parallel to the intent doctrine in analyzing section 2, Sherman Act
claims. 5 The application of the essential facilities doctrine to monopolists will be a subject of focus in this survey.
In World of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co. ,6 the court ruled on the
admissability of conspiracy evidence, the continued application of the
per se rule in vertical price fixing conspiracies, the proof of damages
required in antitrust cases and, finally, the proof of injury required in a
Robinson-Patman Act case. Finally, in Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. Cargill,
Inc.,7 the court reviewed the issue of when a company has standing, pursuant to section 16 of the Clayton Act, to seek injunctive relief against its
competitor's horizontal acquisition of a competing firm.
1. In a fourth antitrust case, City of Chanute v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 754 F.2d 310
(10th Cir. 1985), the issue on appeal was the propriety of a district court grant of a preliminary injunction. Little substantive antitrust law was discussed in the Tenth Circuit's opinion, and therefore it will not be addressed in this survey.
In a fifth case, however, the court, in Rural Elec. Co. v. Cheyenne Light, Fuel & Power
Co., 762 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1985), ruled, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985), that municipalities are protected by the "state action" immunity to federal antitrust laws when state legislation or
constitutional provisions authorize the challenged municipal action. But the Tenth Circuit's decision in Cheyenne Light has lost much of its force because of the enactment of the
Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984), which
states in pertinent part: "No damages, interest on damages, costs, or attorneys fees may
be recovered under section 4, 4A or 4C of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15, 15a, or 15c) from
any local government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity."
Therefore, Cheyenne Light, and Town of Hatie for that matter, retain validity only for claims
arising before September 24, 1984. See Pub. L. No. 98-544, § 6, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984).
2. 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984), af'd, 105 S. Ct 2847 (1985).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
4. Aspen, 738 F.2d at 1520-22.
5. See generally Note, Unclogging the Bottleneck: A New Essential Facility Doctrine, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 441, 446-47 (1983).
6. 756 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 77 (1985).
7. 761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986).
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TO DEAL AND THE INTENT AND ESSENTIAL

FACILITIES DOCTRINES: ASPEN HIGHLANDS SKIING CORP. V.
ASPEN SKIING CO.

In Aspen Highlands Skiing Corporation v. Aspen Skiing Company, 8 the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of monopolization
based upon the defendant's refusal to deal with the plaintiff, Aspen
Highlands. In doing so, the court applied both the intent and essential
facilities doctrines in finding a section 2, Sherman Act violation.
A.

Background

Aspen Highlands Skiing Corporation (Aspen Highlands) owns and
operates Aspen Highlands, a skiing facility located near Aspen, Colorado. Aspen Skiing Company (Aspen Skiing) operates three skiing facilities, Ajax Mountain, Buttermilk and Snowmass, in the same vicinity.9
From the 1962-63 skiing season until the 1971-72 season, Aspen Highlands and Aspen Skiing offered joint multi-day lift tickets which enabled
skiers to ski any of the four mountains. This joint ticket was discontinued in 1972 but was reinstituted in 1973 until the end of the 1976-77
season. 10 Profits from the joint tickets were allocated between the companies based on actual use at the four ski areas. Before the 1977-78
season, Aspen Skiing offered to continue the joint ticket sales if Aspen
Highlands would accept a fixed percentage of 13.2 percent of revenues,
a figure equal to that received by Aspen Highlands in the 1976-77 season, but below the percentage received in previous years. Aspen Highlands objected, claiming that the poor 1976-77 season upon which the
figure was based was a result of external circumstances not likely to recur. The parties eventually settled on a fixed percentage of fifteen percent. " The following season, 1978-79, Aspen Skiing proposed a fixed
percentage of 12.5 percent. Aspen Highlands again preferred to divide
revenues based on the former system of actual usage. Aspen Skiing declined and the parties ultimately failed to reach an agreement on joint
ticket sales. 12
Subsequently, Aspen Skiing offered a multi-day joint ticket for use
only at the three mountains which it operated. In an attempt to offer
skiers a product more marketable than a single mountain lift ticket,
Aspen Highlands introduced a package which included vouchers that
were theoretically negotiable at the Aspen Skiing mountains.' 3 Aspen
Skiing refused to accept the vouchers. Aspen Highlands unsuccessfully
attempted to negotiate with Aspen Skiing to remove all objections to the
vouchers. Aspen Skiing eventually raised single day ticket prices to the
point where it was no longer economically feasible for Aspen Highlands
8. 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985).
9. Id.at 1512.
10. Id.

11. Id.
12. Id.at 1513.
13. Id.at 1521.
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to offer the voucher package. 14 Additionally, Aspen Skiing initiated a
national advertising campaign that implied that there were only three
15
skiing mountains in the Aspen area.
Based on these facts, Aspen Highlands brought suit against Aspen
Skiing under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 16 alleging unlawful monopolization in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 1 7 and conspiracy to
restrain trade in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.' 8 The jury
found in favor of Aspen Skiing on the section 1 claim and in favor of
Aspen Highlands on the section 2 claim.' 9
The Tenth Circuit, after disposing of an important procedural issue, 2 0 affirmed the decisions that Aspen Skiing was guilty of monopolization. The primary issue which the court addressed was the validity of
the theory that Aspen Skiing had a duty to deal with Aspen Highlands.
It determined that Aspen Skiing was guilty of monopolization and
agreed that a duty to deal was properly imposed based on two alternative theories: the intent doctrine, which determines whether the defendant had a purpose to create or maintain a monoply; and the essential
facilities doctrine, which is applied when a business or group of businesses control a scarce facility. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower
court based on both theories. 2 1 By the actions of Aspen Skiing, the
court determined that Aspen Skiing did, in fact, have an intent to mo14. Id.
15. Aspen, 105 S. Ct. at 2852.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [pertaining to foreign persons], any person who shall be injured in his business by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United
States in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. (emphasis added).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) states, in part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony.
19. 738 F.2d at 1513.
20. The defendant, Aspen Skiing Company, argued that the district court erred in its
instructions to the jury concerning the relevant market. The objection made by the defendant to the trial court in the pre-trial conference, however, was not that the market
definition was incorrectly defined but that the market definition should be determined by
the court as a matter of law and should not be submitted to the jury as a question of fact.
In response, the plaintiff, Aspen Highlands, asserted that the defendant could not raise on
appeal the issue of market definition because that particular question was never raised by
objection at the trial level. The Tenth Circuit agreed with Aspen Highlands and held that
Aspen Skiing's proposed instructions would also not suffice to preserve the issue. Finally,
the circuit court concluded that in light of the above facts Aspen Skiing did not adequately
apprise the trial court of the grounds for the objection which it wished to raise on appeal.
738 F.2d at 1513-16.
21. 738 F.2d at 1520-22.
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nopolize. Further, by defining the joint lift ticket as a scarce facility, it
held that Aspen Skiing's refusal to participate with Aspen Highlands resulted in monopolization and again, affirmed a duty to deal. Interestingly, the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens writing for the majority,
affirmed the Tenth Circuit, but based its decision exclusively on the interest doctrine.2 2 According to the Court, Aspen Skiing's actions did
constitute an intent to monopolize. However, the Court did not address
the issue of the possible application of the essential facilities doctrine.
B.

The Intent Doctrine and the Essential FacilitiesDoctrine

Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Colgate,23 in
1919, courts have not imposed antitrust liability for a single monopolist's refusal to deal with a particular party unless the refusal was based
upon an intent to increase or preserve the monopoly. 24 Lawful monopolists - those who, for example, have obtained market power through
superior skill, foresight, and industry2 5- have been accorded wide discretion in choosing with whom they wish to do business. 26 This principle has come to be known as the Colgate doctrine. 2 7 The monopolist's
discretion, however, is not unlimited. The refusal to deal may not be
motivated by an intent to monopolize. The intent test, derived from
dicta in the Colgate case, 28 and more recently expressed in United States v.
Grinnel Corporation,29 is one of two theories under which a duty to deal
can be imposed on a monopolist.
A second theory for imposing a duty to deal upon a monopolist is
the "essential facilities" or "bottleneck" doctrine. Under this theory, a
business or group of businesses cannot limit access to a facility or product, if that facility or product is scarce and essential to the manufacture
or provision of a secondary product or service.30 The elements necessary to the establishment of liability under the essential facilities doctrine are: 1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; 2) a
competitor's inability to duplicate the facility; 3) denial of the use of the
22. Aspen Highlands v. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2847, 2861-62 (1985).
23. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
24.

Note, The Monopolist's Refusal to Deal: An Argunent for a Rule of Reason, 59

TEX.

L.

1107 (1981).
25. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
26. Note, supra note 5, at 443.
27. Note, supra note 5, at 461; Note, supra note 24, at 1107.
28. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307 ("In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion
as to parties with whom he will deal.") (emphasis added).
29. 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) ("The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth
or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.").
30. See Note, Refusals To Deal By Vertically Integrated Monopolists, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1720,
1722 (1974).
REV.
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facility to a competitor; and, 4) the feasibility of providing the facility. 3 1
Noticeably, there is not an expressed element of intent; the essential
facilities doctrine focuses on the detrimental effect on competitors. 3 2
There has been considerable confusion in the application of the essential facilities doctrine. Many courts apply the doctrine to section 1,
Sherman Act concerted activity cases, while others apply it to section 2
monopolization cases. 33 In the seminal essential facilities case, United
States v. Terminal Railroad Association, 34 the Supreme Court considered
the actions of a group of competitors who owned a single corporation
which in turn owned the only terminal for rail traffic coming into the city
of St. Louis from the west. The Court held that the company had a duty
to deal with non-proprietor railroads on reasonable terms and to provide access to the terminal. However, the Court did not specify whether
its ruling was based on section 1 or section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Some courts have strained to find some combination which permits
application of the essential facilities doctrine to section 1 claims. 35 It is
not difficult to understand the application of the essential facilities theory to section 1 claims involving a group of persons who control a facility.3 6 In such cases, any limitation to access by a group of persons
without a business justification should be construed as a conspiracy to
restrain trade or limit competition.
The appropriateness of the essential facilities analysis becomes
doubtful, however, when applied to a single firm's refusal to deal. Section 1 of the Sherman Act speaks only to concerted action. To apply an
essential facilities analysis to a single firm, courts must base their application on section 2 of the Sherman Act. However, proof of a section 2
violation has traditionally been a two element process. The plaintiff
must first establish that the defendant possesses monopoly power in the
relevant market. Second, that power must have been derived as a consequence of the willful acquisition or maintenance of the monopoly power
and not from "a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. ' 13 7 By applying the essential facilities theory to a single firm monopolist, a court may impose a duty to deal on single firm monopolists
without consideration as to the intent of that monopolist. This would be
in direct contravention of the Colgate/Grinnel section 2 intent
requirement.
In Aspen, the Tenth Circuit first determined with respect to satisfaction of the traditional section 2 elements that the first element, market
power, was not at issue. The court held that Aspen Skiing did not pres31. Aspen, 738 F.2d at 1520 (citing MCI Communications, Inc. v. AT & T, 708 F.2d
1081, 1133 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983)).
32. Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 856 (6th Cir. 1979) (but suggesting
this neat theoretical dichotomy may be somewhat blurred in practice).
33. Note, supra note 5, at 452.
34. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
35. See Note, supra note 5,at 453 and cases cited therein.
36. See, e.g., Byars, 609 F.2d 843, 854 (6th Cir. 1979).
37. Grinnel Corporation, 384 U.S. at 571.
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ent an issue as to the sufficiency of the evidence on the district court's
definition of the market.3 8 The court then needed only to address the
possible misuse of that monopoly power. For this, the court relied on
both the intent theory and the essential facilities doctrine.
The question must be asked whether the essential facilities doctrine
should be a basis, either alone or in conjunction with an intent analysis,
for imposing a duty to deal on a single firm if that doctrine does not
include a finding of intent as a necessary element. The answer according to Colgate and its progeny is no. As discussed above, Colgate and
Grinnel mandate a finding of intent.
The Tenth Circuit treated the two duty-to-deal theories as overlapping but potentially alternate independent theories of liability.3 9 However, the essential facilities analysis in the section 2 context is
unnecessary and inconclusive because a court will be required to find
40
intent before a duty to deal is appropriately imposed.
The Tenth Circuit relied on MCI Communications, Inc. v. AT&T for
the elements necessary to establish liability under the essential facilities
doctrine. 4 1 The Seventh Circuit in MCI cited Hecht v. Pro-Football,
Inc.,42 in which the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district
court for failing to give the essential facilities instruction to the jury.
The instruction was to be given with respect to claims of violations of
sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act, both of which require a contract or
combination restraining trade or commerce. In Hecht, the illegal contract was the agreement between the defendants, Pro-Football, Inc., operator of the Washington Redskins, and the District of Columbia
Armory Board, operator of Robert F. Kennedy Stadium. The Seventh
Circuit, in MCI, subsequently applied the analysis of Hecht to MCI, which
was not a Sherman Act section 1 or section 3 case, but a section 2 case.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit's reliance on Hecht, and the Tenth Circuit's
subsequent reliance on MCI, were misplaced.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the Supreme Court would affirm a duty to deal based exclusively on an essential facilities analysis.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Aspen holding based exclusively on the
Tenth Circuit's intent doctrine analysis. The Court specifically declined
43
to address the essential facilities issue.
II.

CONSPIRACY EVIDENCE, THE PER SE RULE, MEASURE OF DAMAGES,
AND INJURY UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN

SLEEP v.

ACT: WORLD OF

LA-Z-Bov

The Tenth Circuit addressed a variety of antitrust issues in World of
38.
39.
40.
41.

738 F.2d at 1513-16.
Id. at 1520 n.13 (citing Byars, 609 F.2d at 857).
738 F.2d at 1520 n.13.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

42. 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
43. 105 S. Ct. at 2862 n.44.
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Sleep v. La-Z-Boy. 4 4 After disposing of an argument by the defendant,
Montgomery Ward, regarding the timeliness of the appeal, 4 5 the court
considered the admission of hearsay evidence to establish a conspiracy
under the Sherman Act, the per se rule of analysis of a vertical price
fixing charge, lost profits as an element of damages under section 4 of
the Clayton Act, and proof of damages for recovery for a Robinson-Patman Act violation.
A.

Background

World of Sleep, Inc. is a high-volume price discounter of retail bedding products, located in Denver, and controlled and operated by
Thomas Hansen. 4 6 In 1975 and 1976, Hansen purchased television and
newspaper advertisements which highlighted World of Sleep's lower
prices in comparison to prices for La-Z-Boy chairs sold by Montgomery
Ward and La-Z-Boy Showcase Shoppe. Montgomery Ward was displeased with World of Sleep's promotion strategy and complained to
La-Z-Boy. Hansen testified that the vice president of sales and marketing for La-Z-Boy, Gary Schroeder, telephoned him to request that the
ads be discontinued. Schroeder could not recall making this call. 4 7 LaZ-Boy then notified World of Sleep that it was past due on its account
and requested a current financial statement, which Hansen refused to
provide. 48 La-Z-Boy subsequently placed various credit restrictions on
World of Sleep, and eventually severely limited the number of chairs
which could be sold to World of Sleep. World of Sleep discontinued the
49
La-Z-Boy line in August, 1977.

Based on these events, World of Sleep filed suit alleging a violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act 50 by defendants La-Z-Boy Chair Company, Montgomery Ward, and Art Mauldin, owner of La-Z-Boy Showcase Shoppe, for allegedly conspiring to maintain the retail price of LaZ-Boy chairs. 5 ' Additionally, World of Sleep claimed that La-Z-Boy
52
Chair Company had violated section 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act
44. 756 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 77 (1985).
45. Id. at 1471. Montgomery Ward contended that even though notices of appeal
were filed by both World of Sleep and La-Z-Boy within thirty days of the district court
order awarding attorneys fees, their failure to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of
the order denying motions for new trial should have rendered the appeals untimely. The
court applied the rationale of Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1980), wherein
the court held that a decision on the me-its which does not dispose of an outstanding
request for attorneys fees is not final for purposes of appeal. The court noted that Gurule
had been subsequently overruled by its recent decision in Cox v. Flood, 683 F.2d 330
(10th Cir. 1982). However, the court held that the Cox decision was rendered after the
appeals were filed in World of Sleep and the Cox rationale would not be retroactively applied.
World of Sleep, 756 F.2d at 1471 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Gladdis, 733 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir.
1984)).
46. 756 F.2d at 1472.
47. Id
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1472-73.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See supra note 17.
51. 756 F.2d at 1470.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1982).
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by discriminating in its advertising allowances. 53
The district court granted summary judgment for Mauldin. The
jury found in favor of the remaining defendants on the Sherman Act
claim, and returned a verdict in favor of World of Sleep on the Robin54
son-Patman Act claim.
B.

The Price Fixing Conspiracy Claims
1. Evidence of Conspiracy

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment for the defendant, Mauldin Corporation. The court held that, pursuant to the federal
rules of evidence governing hearsay, 55 a co-conspirator's hearsay testimony is inadmissable in the absence of sufficient independent evidence
of a conspiracy involving the defendant. 56 The.words or actions of a coconspirator are admissable only after the court has established the existence of a conspiracy with independent evidence of that conspiracy. 5 7 In
the instant case, World of Sleep wished to present, as hearsay evidence
against the Mauldin Corporation, tapes of telephone calls made by a LaZ-Boy representative to Hansen in which the La-Z-Boy representative
told Hansen that Mauldin had been requested to "hold the line" on LaZ-Boy chair prices. 58 World of Sleep presented, as independent evidence of the conspiracy, surveys which indicated that Mauldin's advertising became less price-oriented after this request. The Tenth Circuit
agreed with the trial court that these survey results did not constitute
evidence sufficient to establish a conspiracy. Therefore, the trial court
had properly excluded the tapes of the telephone conversations and
59
granted summary judgment in Mauldin's favor.
The Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion regarding World of
Sleep's conspiracy claim against Montgomery Ward. Montgomery Ward
claimed on appeal that the trial court had erred in not granting it a directed verdict because the evidence relating to the price fixing charge
was insufficient to raise ajury issue. The court merged the hearsay analysis applied to Mauldin with the rule addressing the quantum of conspiracy evidence necessary to raise a jury issue, as recently established in
Monsanto Co. v. Spray Rite Service Corp.6 0
53. 756 F.2d at 1470. La-Z-Boy unsuccessfully raised a counter claim under the Colorado Unfair Practice Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-105 (1973), alleging that World of Sleep
had unlawfully sold La-Z-Boy chairs below cost. The jury found against this claim and the
Tenth Circuit affirmed. 756 F.2d at 1480-81.
54. Id. at 1470.
55.

FED. R. EvID. 104, 801.

56. 756 F.2d at 1474.
57. See United States v. Peterson, 611 F.2d 1313, 1330 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 905 (1980). Peterson set forth a test whereby the court must determine, prior to
the admission of hearsay, that the party seeking admission of the hearsay statement has

shown by independent evidence that it is more likely than not that: 1) the conspiracy existed; 2) the declarant and defendant were members of the conspiracy; and 3) the statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy.
58. 756 F.2d at 1474.

59. Id.
60.

104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).

The Tenth Circuit held that although the Monsanto case
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A plaintiff seeking relief under section 1 of the Sherman Act bears
the burden of introducing evidence sufficient to support a finding of an
unlawful contract, combination, or conspiracy. 6 1 The Supreme Court,
in Monsanto, held that a jury may not infer a conspiracy agreement
merely from complaints by a buyer, or even from the fact that the seller
terminated his business with the buyer due to the complaints. 6 2 The
Tenth Circuit, in World of Sleep, noted that the district court's determination that the taped telephone conversations were admissable against
Montgomery Ward was based solely on the type of evidence held to be
insufficient by Monsanto to raise a factual issue of conspiracy- complaints by the seller, Montomery Ward, who competes with the pricecutting plaintiff, World of Sleep. 63 Therefore, the trial court had improperly admitted the co-conspirator hearsay evidence. Furthermore,
Montgomery Ward's complaints, standing alone, were insufficient to
raise ajury question, in accordance with Monsanto. Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit held that the trial court improperly allowed the Sherman Act
claim against Montgomery Ward to be submitted to the jury. 64
With respect to the Sherman Act claim against La-Z-Boy, however,
the taped telephone conversations which were inadmissable as to
Mauldin and Montgomery Ward were held to be admissable by the
court. The tapes were not co-conspirator hearsay, but rather were party
admissions by La-Z-Boy. 6 5 The holding regarding Mauldin was not that
a conspiracy with La-Z-Boy did not exist, but that evidence of the alleged conspiracy was inadmissable against Mauldin. Hence, La-Z-Boy
could still be accused of conspiring with Mauldin. 66 The court stated
that evidence, including the tapes and the fact that although World of
Sleep refused to agree to price fixing other buyers had agreed to the
arrangement, was sufficient to submit the conspiracy issue to the jury
67
regarding La-Z-Boy.
2.

The Per Se Rule of Vertical Price Fixing

After affirming the trial court's decision that the evidence was sufficient to send the section 1 Sherman Act claim against La-Z-Boy to the
jury, the Tenth Circuit considered the instructions given to the jury on
that claim. The district court had instructed the jury to consider the
dealt with the measure of conspiracy evidence sufficient to avoid a directed verdict for a
defendant that was a manufacturer, the Monsanto analysis is equally applicable in a case
where the defendant is not a manufacturer but is a "dealer-competitor." 756 F.2d at 1475.
61. Id. at 1475 (quoting Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1471 n.8).
62. 756 F.2d at 1475.
63. Id
64. Id. Because the jury had found for Montgomery Ward on this claim, it was unnecessary to reverse the trial court as to this part of its decision.
65. Id. at 1476 n.2 (citing FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E)).
66. 756 F.2d at 1476 n.2 (citing United States v. Sangmister, 685 F.2d 1124, 1126-27
(9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d 764, 776 (10th Cir. 1975)).
67. 756 F.2d at 1475-76 (citing Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Industries, Inc., 729
F.2d 676, 685-86 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 178 (1984)). For a discussion of the
Black Gold decision, see Note, Eleventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Antitrust, 62 DEN. U.L.

REV. 25, 26-33 (1985).
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claim under the rule of reason. 68 Under the rule of reason, courts must
balance the anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects of the complained of actions. 69 World of Sleep argued that the per se rule should
have been applied instead. 70 According to the per se rule, if a practice
falls within a specified category of activities, it is deemed illegal without
any inquiry as to pro-competitive effects. The plaintiff must simply
71
prove that the defendant did the proscribed practice.
In 1983, the Tenth Circuit rejected the application of the per se rule
in Mid West Underground Storage, Inc. v. Porter,72 a case involving a conspiracy to eliminate competition. This appeared to conform with the judicial trend away from the per se rule and toward the rule of reason. 73 In
World of Sleep the court noted this trend, citing in particular Continental
T. V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 74 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that non75
price vertical restraints are to be judged under the rule of reason.
However, the Tenth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court in Monsanto had declined to abrogate the application of the per se rule in vertical price fixing agreement cases. 76 Therefore, Monsanto required that
the Tenth Circuit apply the per se standard to this case.
La-Z-Boy argued that the per se rule applies only when a specific
price has been maintained, and not when an agreement was intended
merely to maintain general price levels. 7 7 The Tenth Circuit rejected
this argument, relying in part on United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 78
In that case, the Supreme Court said that the test is not whether a specific price was intended to be maintained, but whether a dealer had been
deprived of the ability to exercise his independent judgment in making
79
pricing decisions.
World of Sleep had introduced evidence that La-Z-Boy intended to
pressure Mauldin into maintaining a certain price level.8 0 Accordingly,
the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded on this issue, ordering the
trial court to instruct the jury that the alleged agreement, if it existed,
was illegal per se.8 1
3.

Lost Profits from Licensee Sales

World of Sleep, prior to dropping the La-Z-Boy chair line, had licensing agreements with four other stores in the Denver area whereby
68. 756 F.2d at 1476.
69. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
70. 756 F.2d at 1476.
71. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Lipner, Antitrust's Per Se Rule: Reports of its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 60 DEN. L.J. 593 (1983).
72. 717 F.2d 493 (10th Cir. 1983).
73. See Lipner, supra note 71, at 593-94.
74. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
75. Id.
76. 756 F.2d at 1476-77. See also Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1469.
77. 756 F.2d at 1476-77.
78. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
79. Id. at 221.
80. 756 F.2d at 1477.
81. Id.
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World of Sleep sold merchandise, including La-Z-Boy chairs, to these
licensees and provided them warehouse facilities and advertising.8 2 LaZ-Boy had unsuccessfully argued at trial that it should have been
awarded the lost profits that it could have realized on sales of La-Z-Boy
chairs to its licensee stores. The Tenth Circuit stated that under section
4 of the Clayton Act, 83 a plaintiff must prove an antitrust violation, the
fact of damage or injury, and measurable damages. 8 4 After determining
that the injury-in-fact requirement was satisfied by World of Sleep's
proof of at least some damage flowing from an unlawful conspiracy, the
court considered the question of what level of proof was necessary to
support an award of damages. The Tenth Circuit quoted Story Parchment
Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,85 wherein the Supreme Court concluded that it is enough for a plaintiff to establish the extent of damages
"as a matter ofjust and reasonable inference, although the result may be
only approximate." '86 The Tenth Circuit concluded that "[i]f proof of a
profit and loss history were required, no plaintiff could ever recover
'8 7
losses resulting from his inability to enter a market."
World of Sleep had proffered evidence of damages through an expert witness, who introduced a method by which lost profits could be
calculated.8 8 Other evidence tended to prove the unique character of
La-Z-Boy chairs and World of Sleep's inability to effectively replace that
brand. Therefore, the court ruled that the trial court had improperly
excluded evidence of lost licensee sales profits, and ordered that the
trial court admit this evidence on retrial. 89
C.

Injury Under the Robinson-Patman Act

La-Z-Boy manufactured two very similar lines of chairs. Generally,
La-Z-Boy offered a promotional allowance of $2.25 to $3.00 per chair on
one line, but provided only advertising aids to stores carrying the other.
Montgomery Ward sold the first line and, therefore, received the promotional allowance, while World of Sleep carried the second line and
rarely received an advertising allowance. 9 0 World of Sleep alleged that
this constituted a violation of section 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
On appeal, La-Z-Boy argued that the issue should not have gone to the
jury. It claimed that World of Sleep had offered no evidence of actual
injury as required by section 4 of the Clayton Act. 9 '
82. Id.

83. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). See supra note 16.
84.
209 (3d
85.
86.

756 F.2d at 1478 (citing Danny Kresky Enterprises Corp. v. Magid, 716 F.2d 206,
Cir. 1983)).
282 U.S. 555 (1931).
Id. at 563.

87. 756 F.2d at 1478.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1479.
90. Id.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1976). The court stated in a footnote that the facts more properly gave rise to a section 2(d) claim than a section 2(e) claim. Section 2(e) applies when a
seller performs promotional services for the buyer, while section 2(d) applies when the
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The Tenth Circuit held that the Supreme Court, inJ Truitt Payne Co.
v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,92 had established the test for damages with respect to violations of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 93 Under
section 2(a), the plaintiff must show actual injury arising from an antitrust law violation. 94 Because section 2(e) damages are also governed
by section 4 of the Clayton Act, the court extended this test to section
2(e) violations. Therefore, a plaintiff must establish not only that he
failed to receive a promotional allowance but also that his ability to com95
pete was adversely affected as a result.
World of Sleep failed to show that its ability to compete was adversely affected in any manner by being denied the promotional allowance. Testimony established that World of Sleep had been very
successful with the La-Z-Boy chair line.9 6 The Tenth Circuit concluded
that World of Sleep had failed to prove injury-in-fact as required by section 4 of the Clayton Act, and the Robinson-Patman jury decision was
therefore reversed by the court.
III.

STANDING TO SEEK INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO PREVENT A
COMPETITOR'S MERGER: MONFORT OF COLORADO, INC.
v. CARCILI INC

A.

Background

In Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. Cargill,Inc.9 7 the Tenth Circuit affirmed
a district court order granting injunctive relief to Monfort of Colorado,
Inc., thereby precluding a competitor's horizontal acquisition of a third
competing firm. Excel Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of the
defendant, Cargill, Inc. 98 Monfort is the fifth largest beef packer in the
country, and Excel is the second largest. 99 Excel signed an agreement
with Land O'Lakes, Inc. to acquire Land O'Lakes' Spencer Beef Division, the country's third largest beef packer.10 0 Monfort brought suit
pursuant to section 16 of the Clayton Act,' 0 ' to enjoin Excel's acquisiseller pays the buyer a price allowance for the services to be rendered by the buyer. 756
F.2d at 1479 n.6.
92. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
It should be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce.., to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality ...
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly.
94. 756 F.2d at 1479 (citingJ. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 562).
95. 756 F.2d at 1479 (citingJ. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 563-64 n.4).
96. 756 F.2d at 1480.
97. 761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986).
98. 761 F.2d at 572.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
[Any corporation . . . shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief...
against threatened loss or damages by a violation of the antitrust laws ....
when and
under the same conditions and principles... upon ... a showing that the danger
or irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue...
[emphasis added].
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tion of Spencer Beef. Monfort claimed that the acquisition would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, 1 2 and section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 10 3 The district court ruled in favor of Monfort. 10 4 On appeal, the
primary issue was whether Monfort had standing to seek injunctive
relief.
B.

Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Section 16
of the Clayton Act

The concept of standing in antitrust cases has continued to be a
troublesome area for the courts.' 0 5 This has been most evident in cases
involving section 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides treble damages to
persons injured by violations of the antitrust laws. 06 There is an underlying fear in the federal courts that failure to limit the scope of section 4
standing under the antitrust laws could lead to duplicative or excessive
recoveries based on a single violation. 10 7 In Monfort, however, the danger of duplicative or excessive damages did not exist since section 16
injunctive relief was requested. ' 0 8
The court therefore distinguished Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-OMat, Inc.,109 the landmark case which established that plaintiffs in section 4 cases must prove actual injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent. The Tenth Circuit said that section 16 does not
require actual injury and, therefore, does not foreclose claims for which
the injury has not yet occurred."10 The court needed to inquire only
into the causal connection between the "threatened injury and the putative antitrust violation.""' The court likened this inquiry to proximate
cause analysis. 1 2 Based on these conclusions, the court considered
whether Excel's acquisition of Spencer Beef would be the proximate
cause of a future antitrust injury to Monfort.
In support of the causation argument, Monfort alleged that the acquisition of Spencer Beef by Excel would allow Excel to engage in pred102. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). This section provides, in part, that "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the ... assets of another corporation.., where ... the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly."
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See supra note 17.
104. 591 F. Supp. 683 (D.Colo. 1983). After discussing its findings and conclusions as
to the section 7 Clayton Act claim, the district court declined to reach the question of
whether a section 1 Sherman Act violation had taken place. Id. at 710.
105. See Saul, Antitrust Standing: Some Light at Last? 14 U. TOL. L. REv. 521 (1983); see also
Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). See supra note 16.
107. Saul, supra note 105, at 521 n.2; see also Note, Antitrust Ih4ury and Standing: A Question
of Legal Cause, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1011, 1014-15 (1983).
108. Monfort, 761 F.2d at 574.
109. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
110. 761 F.2d at 575 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S.
100 (1969)).
111. 761 F.2d at 574.
112. Id. (citing Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982)). See also
Note, supra note 107, at 1032-39 (discussing proximate cause analysis with respect to section 4 of the Clayton Act).
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atory pricing and thereby drive competitors out of the beef packing and
fabricating business. Thus, the acquisition would ultimately lead to a
decrease in competition, which would be a violation of section 7 of the
Clayton Act.' '3 The Tenth Circuit agreed with Monfort. It noted that
reaching its decision was made more difficult by the fact that the predatory pricing was only threatened (as would be the case in any case in
which injunctive relief was being sought) but said that "Monfort's theory
of injury [was] logically related to harm caused by increased concentration of economic power."' 14 Since the Clayton Act was intended to be a
"prophylactic measure," it was not necessary to await the use of that
15
increased market power before injunctive relief was appropriate.'
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that Monfort had standing to seek an
injunction that would block Excel's acquisition of Spencer Beef.
The Tenth Circuit recognized that a potential for abuse exists when
competitors have the power to challenge each other's corporate mergers. The court said, however, that to forbid all private challenges to
mergers by competitors, as Excel proposed, would be too drastic, inasmuch as "Congress [has] created a private remedy for enforcing section
7 [of the Clayton Act] and hence apparently did not think that all private
challenges would be spurious."' 16 The court observed that even the
Justice Department was only asking that the court engage in a searching
scrutiny of private plaintiffs' allegations of injury before granting injunctive relief, but was not suggesting a complete denial of private party
7
standing in such cases.''
After disposing of the critical remedial issue of whether section 16
standing was appropriate, the Tenth Circuit easily affirmed the district
court's substantive ruling that a section 7 Clayton Act violation had occurred. The court ruled that the product and geographic markets which
had been applied by the district court, and its finding of a significant
entry barrier were not "clearly erroneous."' 8
David E. Doran

113.

See supra note 105.

114. 761 F.2d at 576. The court rejected arguments made by Excel that predatory
pricing would merely be a manifestation of "pure competition," stating that predatory
pricing was an evil that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Id. at 575.
115. Id. at 576.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing a Justice Department amicus brief liled in an unrelated case). In sticcessfullv urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to the ,honr case, however, Justice
l)epartment lawyers argued that "allowing injunctions in circumstances like Ithose of the
.llonfort easel would 'increase substantially the likelihood that liling an antitrust suit will
become a routine tactic."
National l.aw Journal, January 27, 1986, at 28. col. 2.
118. 761 F.2d a[ 579.

